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A B ST R ACT. Many concession agreements between governments of developing countries and
corporations have failed to produce expected infrastructural, monetary, and efficiency gains. This
Note argues that these agreements fail in part because the parties construct them as traditional
private contracts. Given their subject matter, their noneconomic focus and purposes, and the
ways in which they shape future economic development strategy, international policymakers and
business leaders should conceptually and procedurally recast concession agreements as
traditional matters of public policy. This reinterpretation will make the agreements more stable
and successful by maling their costs and benefits more transparent, their drafters more
accountable to the populations they are intended to benefit, and their terms more responsive to
the concerns of those populations.
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INTRODUCTION
In September 1999, the Bolivian government signed a forty-year
concession agreement with Aguas del Tunari, a consortium led by a British
subsidiary of Bechtel, for water supply and sanitation services in Cochabamba,
Bolivia Six months later, the government cancelled the agreement amid
sustained and escalating rioting by the local population and returned
responsibility for the water service to the municipal authority. Although the
Cochabamba concession is remarkable for its swift and abject collapse, its fate
is part of a larger pattern.
A concession agreement is an agreement between a government and a
private company (the "concessionaire"), in which the government transfers to
the company the right to maintain, produce, or provide a good or service
within the country for a limited period of time, but the government retains
ultimate ownership of the right.' A substantial number of these agreements
signed between the governments of developing countries and foreign
corporations have recently failed, across many different subject matters and
geographic areas.4 In the water industry alone, at least seven major concession
agreements have collapsed in the last decade.5 Some experts estimate that as
1. Andrew Nickson & Claudia Vargas, The Limitations of Water Regulation: The Failure of the
Cochabamba Concession in Bolivia, 21 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 128, 128 (2002).
2. William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain: The World Is Running Out of Fresh Water, and the Fight
To Control It Has Begun, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 2002, at 43.
3. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., POLICY BRIEF: COMPETITION POLICY AND
CONCESSIONS 1 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/ 4 7/387o6o36.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Young Hoo Kwak, Analyzing Asian Infrastructure Development Privatization Market,
J. CONSTRUCTION ENGINEERING & MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2002, at i1o (detailing the failure of
roughly thirty percent of the power, transportation, and water concession agreements
awarded in twelve Asian countries from 1985 to 1998); John A. Gray, Forest Concession
Policies and Revenue Systems: Country Experience and Policy Changes for Sustainable Tropical
Forestry 53-66 (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 522, 2002) (discussing the large-scale
failures of forestry concession agreements in Central and Southeast Asia and West Africa); J.
Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont & St6phane Straub, Renegotiation of Concession Contracts
in Latin America 23 tbl. 3 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 3011, 2003),
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/
IB/2003/04/25/000094946_03041204014593/Rendered/PDF/multiopage.pdf (noting a fifty-
two percent renegotiation or failure rate within three years for infrastructure concessions in
Latin America in the 199os).
s. See, e.g., DAVID HALL, WATER PRIVATISATION IN LATIN AMERICA 4 (1999), available at
http://www.psiru.org/reports/99og-w-latam.doc; Kathleen Slattery, Inst. for Pub.-Private
P'ships, Inc., What Went Wrong; Lessons from Manila, Buenos Aires, and Atlanta (2004),
http://www.ip3.org/pub/publication2oo3-oo2.htm. See generally Guasch et al., supra note 4,
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many as fifty percent of all concession agreements signed since the mid-198os
have been renegotiated or cancelled.6 This Note seeks to aid the understanding
of why these concession agreements break down. It argues that concession
agreements fail because their governmental function clashes with their private
method and venue of creation.
In their regulatory, proprietary, and administrative capacities, governments
perform a variety of functions, not all of which qualify as public policy creation.
Under the rubric I set forth, a government creates public policy when it
addresses a subject matter that the populace views as properly a matter of
public concern, and when its actions are likely to affect broadly the public's
well-being. This definition of public policy tracks that found in legal
dictionaries7 and in the work of political scientists Charles L. Cochran8 and
Steven Kelman.9 Given the breadth of this definition and its mix of both
objective and context-specific components, what qualifies as public policy will
necessarily vary based on the history and conditions of a given country."
at 23 tbl. 3 (noting that seventy percent of Latin American water concessions have failed or
been renegotiated, ninety percent of those within three years of their creation).
6. See, e.g., Antonio Estache, PPI Partnerships vs. PPI Divorces in LDCs, 29 REV. INDUS. ORG. 3,
4(2006).
7. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004) (defining public policy as "standards
regarded... as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society"); 8 THE
GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 351 (1984) (defining public policy as "manifest[ing] the common
sense and common conscience of the citizens as a whole that extends throughout the state
and is applied to matters of public health, safety, and welfare" and the "general, well-settled
public opinion relating to the duties of citizens to their fellow citizens ... that fluctuates
with the changing economic needs, social customs, and moral aspirations of the people").
8. See, e.g., CHARLES L. COCHRAN & ELOISE F. MALONE, PUBLIC POLICY: PERSPECTIVES AND
CHOICES 1 (3d ed. 2005) (defining public policy as "government decisions and actions
designed to deal with a matter of public concern").
9. See STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
5-6 (198 7) (defining public policy as "a set of governmental actions... that have effects on
people's lives, positive or negative" and the result of a process that "starts with ideas citizens
have about actions they want the government to undertake").
1o. Some measures, such as the provision of potable water or major infrastructural projects, are
viewed as matters within the public arena in most, if not all, countries. See infra notes ioi-
103 and accompanying text. But others, such as provision of housing or healthcare, will
depend more on the demographics and traditional role of the government in a particular
country. See, e.g., Caries Muntaner et al., Venezuela's Barrio Adentro: An Alternative to
Neoliberalism in Health Care, 36 INT'L J. HEALTH SERVICES 803, 803 (2006) (noting that all
Latin American countries except Cuba shifted to view healthcare as a private market rather
than public policy in the 199os based on industry performance, economics, and political
ideologies).
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In effective governance, the function that the government performs
matches the method and venue the government uses." Typically, to create
public policy, an efficient government uses a highly visible and transparent
venue (for example, a legislature or publicly accessible meeting) and an openly
participatory and deliberative method (for example, a bill passage procedure).' 2
By contrast, to make a personal deal, two people or groups work in a private
venue through the insular method of bilateral negotiation.'3 When a potential
conflict arises between the function and the method or venue, an effective
government will mediate the conflict through procedural reforms. For
example, an American administrative agency (a generally opaque venue)
introduces a public notice, comment, and debate period (a more participatory
method) when it engages in public policy rule making.
14
Part I of this Note explains that governments and concessionaires (that is,
the private companies that enter into concession agreements) often conceive of
and create concession agreements as traditional bilateral contracts, soliciting,
negotiating, and enacting them in an opaque venue and by an opaque method
involving only a few high-level government officials, lawyers, and company
representatives. Part II shows how the venue and method of concession
agreements' creation contribute to the agreements' failures by inducing
government officials to make ineffective policies and by exacerbating local
opposition to the agreements. Part III argues for reconceptualizing concession
agreements as traditional matters of public policy; it then suggests some
11. See, e.g., KELMAN, supra note 9, at 209 (noting that we can "judg[e] if the policy-making
process tends to produce good policy by examining features of the process").
12. Id. at 23; Pablo T. Spiller & Mariano Tommasi, The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy:
A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 281, 290 (2003)
(arguing that the U.S. Congress's institutional design enables it to create public policy
effectively and comparing it favorably to countries with weak legislatures where "political
exchanges will take place in alternative settings that will tend to be less formal, more
uncertain, and harder to monitor, observe, and enforce").
13. The reason for this is that it would be inefficient, ineffectual, and normatively unnecessary
to bring the issue into public debate because the deal will not substantially affect the welfare
of people not a party to the deal, or the public does not view it as an issue of public concern.
For the purposes of this Note, then, public debate can be viewed as imposing transaction
costs that outweigh the benefits of the debate where the issue does not affect the public.
14. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, 41 Fed. Reg. 29,653, 29,654-55 (July 19, 1976) ("Agencies should afford
interested persons the opportunity to participate as effectively as possible in notice-and-
comment rulemaking proceedings. Therefore, in order to enlarge the opportunity for public
participation and increase its effectiveness, agencies in appropriate circumstances should




procedural reforms to eliminate the identified mismatch and thus increase the
sustainability and efficiency of concession agreements.
Scholars and advocates have suggested many large-scale substantive
changes to concession agreements. This Note does not attempt to address the
merits of these suggestions, which include schemes to alter the number or
subject matter of concession agreements agreed to by foreign governments,"
their duration,6 and the regulatory regimes that should surround them.
1 7
Instead, this Note provides a novel explanation for concession agreements'
failures and sets the groundwork for procedural remedies to enhance their
viability.
I. THE PRIVATE, CONTRACTUAL CREATION OF CONCESSION
AGREEMENTS
This Part describes how actors currently create concession agreements as
traditional bilateral contracts. It focuses on two aspects of the process-
prevention of democratic consideration and insulation from public knowledge.
Governments, concessionaires, and scholars traditionally treat concession
agreements as private, bilateral contracts between high-ranking national
officials and the concessionaire company. Two aspects of the creation process
reveal this approach. First, officials preclude broad, open deliberation at each
stage of the creation of concession agreements: they remove initial debate over
the agreements from legislative procedure; negotiate the agreements directly
with prospective concessionaires; and give the signed agreements the
immediate force of law. Second, the parties shield the agreements from public
is. See, e.g., DAVID HALL ET AL., WATER PRIVATISATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN ASIA-PACIFIC 3
(2004), available at http://www.psiru.org/reports/2o04-12-W-Asia.doc; Emanuele Lobina,
Problems with Private Water Concessions: A Review of Experiences and Analysis of Dynamics, 21
INT'L J. WATER RESOURCES DEv. 55, 77-78 (2005).
16. See, e.g., Sudong Ye & Robert L.K. Tiong, The Effect of Concession Period Design on
Completion Risk Management of BOT Projects, 21 CONSTRUCTION MGMT. & ECON. 471, 472,
474 (2003) (discussing the length and structure of concession periods in a specific contract
setting); Xueqing Zhang & Simaan M. AbouRizk, Determining a Reasonable Concession Period
for Private Sector Provision of Public Works and Services, 33 CANADIAN J. CIV. ENGINEERING
622, 623 (2006).
17. See, e.g., Paul Cook, Privatization and Utility Regulation in Developing Countries: The Lessons
So Far, 70 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIVE ECON. 549, 550-52 (i999); David Parker, Colin
Kirkpatrick & Catarina Figueira-Theodorakopoulou, Infrastructure Regulation and Poverty
Reduction in Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and a Research Agenda, 47 Q..REv.
ECON. & FIN. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 5-9), available at http://www.competition
-regulation.org.uk/conferences/BraziPapers/ParkerKirkpatrickFigueira.pdf (discussing
regulation of foreign investment in development infrastructure).
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knowledge or influence: they provide the public with limited information
about the concessionaire selection process and content of the concession
agreements, and limited influence over the result.
A. Preventing Democratic Deliberation
Executive government officials treat concession agreements as private
contracts by precluding democratic deliberation at each step of the process.
First, they initially prevent the legislature from debating the merits of pursuing
a concession agreement. This removal clearly distinguishes the concession
agreements from other matters of domestic public policy created through
deliberative legislative action, both in the United States 8 and the countries
discussed in this Note. 9
In many developing countries, parties face preliminary difficulties in
pursuing concession agreements. Many national constitutions and statutes
require majority state-ownership and maintenance in the sector of the desired
concession agreement.2" Even where no formal statutory barriers to the
agreement exist, practical obstacles, such as the dearth of standardized rules or
organized oversight regimes governing concessions, remain."
To address these initial obstacles to concession agreements, the
government official who spearheads the effort (often a member of the executive
branch) frequently makes unilateral decisions. The official will simply ignore
the limiting constitutional or statutory provisions, as well as practical obstacles,
and will often negotiate an agreement that seems to conflict with existing
domestic law. Or, the official will clear these obstacles through
pronouncement. For example, in 1997, the President of Bolivia used an
18. See, e.g., Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 357 (1931) ("Primarily
it is for the lawmakers to determine the public policy of the State."). Where the venue of
creation is not initially democratically accountable, U.S. policymakers will often move to
make the process more accountable. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
ig. My analysis presumes that an alternative, more transparent process exists through which
these concession agreements could be set up, negotiated, and enacted. It therefore fails to
adequately capture those authoritarian governments in which public policy is never created
through open deliberation.
20. For an excellent survey of such laws, see Ha-Joon Chang, Regulation of Foreign Investment in
Historical Perspective, 16 EUR. J. DEv. REs. 687 (2004).
21. Bolivia, for example, had neither a true executive department to oversee water concession
agreements nor any coherent procedure for choosing a concessionaire or agreeing to a
concession prior to 1999. Nickson & Vargas, supra note 1, at 133-35.




executive decree to enact the legislation that ultimately paved the way for the
Cochabamba concession by establishing the Office of Water Regulation and
the procedures for concession agreements.23 In the Philippines, President
Ferdinand Marcos enacted Presidential Decree Number 705, which allowed the
newly created Forestry Department to enter into service contracts "with any
foreign person or entity" for "exploration, development, exploitation or
utilization of the forest resources."' Even when these provisions to enable
concession agreements technically do pass through the legislature,
international actors and government officials often fast-track them without
much time for vigorous debate. The president or other government official -
sometimes influenced by major international actors such as the World Bank or
International Monetary Fund-employs such a heavy hand that he or she
effectively circumvents the legislative process.2" Thus, government officials
treat concession agreements as bilateral contracts by precluding effective
legislative consideration at the earliest stages of the agreement.
This contractual treatment extends beyond the early planning stages of
concession agreement creation and through the negotiation and enactment
phases. Participants also treat concession agreements as traditional bilateral
contracts when they engage in private, bilateral negotiations over the terms of
the agreements. A small cadre of government officials often negotiates the
contract outside of a democratic or legislative procedure. Government officers
personally meet the preselected private company and lawyers, in small groups
away from the legislature and the public, to discuss the terms of the concession
agreement as though it were a traditional private contract. In the case of the
Cochabamba concession, a government team that consisted of the Deputy
Minister of Privatization, a local official, the appointed electricity regulator, and
23. Nickson & Vargas, supra note 1, at 132-34. The Office of Water Regulation currently exists as
"the Sectoral Superintendency for Basic Sanitation." Id. at 133, 135.
24. Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines, Pres. Dec. No. 705, § 62, 71:28 O.G. 4289, (May
19, 1975) (Phil.). Executives are more commonly able to use pronouncements to overcome
obstacles to concession agreements in countries such as the Philippines that lack a full-
fledged democracy.
2S. For example, the World Bank or International Monetary Fund may either intercede directly
or make loans only on the condition that the legislature liberalizes state ownership
requirements or privatization. See, e.g., BENIDICTE BuLL, ALF MORTEN JERVE & ERLEND
SIGVALDSEN, CENTRE FOR DEV. AND THE ENV'T, THE WORLD BANK'S AND THE IMF's USE OF
CONDITIONALITY To ENCOURAGE PRIVATIZATION AND LIBERALIZATION: CURRENT ISSUES AND
PRACTICES 24 (2007), available at http://www.sum.uio.no/publications/
pdf fulltekst/report_13.pdf; Sara Grusky, Global Challenge Initiative, Presentation to the
National Forum on Water Privatisation, Accra, Ghana: The World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund and the Right to Water (May 2001), available at
http://www.isodec.org.gh/Papers/saragruskyMay2oo1.PDF.
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the appointed water regulator met directly with the proposed concessionaire
officials to conduct the negotiation. 6 In Manila, the world's largest water
concession agreement was negotiated between President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, the Economic Planning Secretary, the Chief Government Corporate
Counsel, and representatives from the company that would be granted the
concession, Maynilad Water Services, Inc.27
Finally, once the parties set the terms of the concession agreement, the
same insulated group signs the agreement, and it gains the immediate force of
law as a contract.2 For example, the parties signed the Cochabamba concession
agreement on September 3, 1999, and Aguas del Tunari began its operations in
Cochabamba in November 1999.29 The agreements do not need to gain any
legislative approbation.3 0  Thus, as with traditional bilateral contracts,
concessionaires and government officials set up the agreements outside of the
legislature, negotiate concession agreements privately, and give the concession
agreement the force of law upon enactment.
B. Insulation from Public Knowledge or Influence
Officials also treat concession agreements as private contracts by limiting
public influence and access to information. The extralegislative process by
which the parties create concession agreements not only circumvents
democratic deliberation, but also limits the public's ability both to acquire
knowledge about the selection of concessionaires and the terms of the
agreement and to exert any influence on these issues.
Government officials often disseminate little information about the
concession bidding and bid selection procedure.31 They may withhold
information from the public about the method by which they solicit bids or
whether prospective bidders must meet a prequalification condition to qualify
for consideration. The government may not make clear whether
26. Nickson &Vargas, supra note 1, at 135, 136 n.n.
27. Maitet Diokno-Pascual, Bantay Tubig, Lessons from the Suez-Maynilad Water Venture 2-3
(Oct. 18, 2004), http://www.ipd.ph/Bantay/o2oTubig/web-content/Updates/PDFFiles/
Lessons%2ofrom%2oSuez-Maynilad%2ofinal%2over.pdf.
28. See id.
29. Nickson &Vargas, supra note i, at 136-37.
30. Again, even where concession agreements technically must pass through the legislature,
passage can be merely a formality as they are often fast-tracked and aided by the president
or the influence of a major international force, just as they can be in the planning stages. See
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Lobina, supra note 15, at 66-67.
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concessionaires must have some connection to the government, a proven track
record in the industry, or a minimum amount of available capital in order to
qualify for consideration, and whether each of the candidates considered meets
any or all of these qualifications. For example, in a concession agreement to
access road connections into Bogoti, Colombia, the government officials
unilaterally cancelled a public bid prequalification system and did not make
clear whether the accepted bidder met any prescreening requirements.
32
Furthermore, the government officials who make the final choice often
decline to discuss publicly the reasons behind their final choice among the
qualified bidders. The selection criteria may vary greatly and play a large part
in determining the allocation and amount of benefits distributed. For example,
if the award is based on the highest bidder (as in freight railway concessions in
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina33) the benefits will initially accrue to the
government, which gains maximum short-term revenue. But if the award is
based in part on the lowest price for the service (such as in bus operation
contracts in Santiago34), or the highest number of employees retained (as in the
Argentine freight railway concessions 35), it will directly benefit consumers or
employees, respectively.36  However, in the case of some concession
agreements, the government entity never states how or why it chose the
particular bidder from the "qualified" group.
37
Second, the executive government official may withhold the agreement's
general content, or even its existence, from the public until after the agreement
becomes binding. Stakeholders may not even be aware of the agreement until
after its implementation. For example, in the Cochabamba case, the parties
only released the terms of the concession agreement after it was awarded.38
32. See PAULINA BEATO, INTER-AM. DEV. BANK, ROAD CONCESSIONS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM
FOUR COUNTRIES 5 (1997), available at http://cdi.mecon.gov.ar/biblio/docelec/MU2o13.pdf
("Colombian regulations require a public bid for concession roads. However, if the public
authority declares the bid vacant ... it can then contract directly with a supplier. This has
often been the case. For instance, the projects El Cortpo-El Vino and Cali-Candelaria were
declared vacant and were later negotiated with a sole bidder.").
33. L. Nicola Shaw, Kenneth M. Gwilliam & Louis S. Thompson, Concessions in Transport 14
(Transport Div., World Bank, Discussion Paper No. TWU-27, 1996), available at
http ://www.worldbank.org/transport/publicat/twu_27.pdf.
34. Id. at 28.
3S. Id. at 29.
36. Id. at 14.
37. This has led some commentators to infer that selection results from anticompetitive
practices or from inducements at the bid competition or selection stage. See, e.g., Lobina,
supra note 15, at 59-60.
38. Nickson & Vargas, supra note 1, at 147.
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Given the short turnaround time of two months between enactment and the
start of operations, most people likely did not hear about the terms that
affected them until Aguas del Tunari assumed control. In Malaysia, the water
agreement between the concessionaire Syabas and the federal and Selangor
state governments was still not declassified eleven months after the
agreement's implementation, and people only learned the terms of the
agreement piecemeal from a brokerage company when they faced a raise in
their water rates.39 Furthermore, even if the public does receive information
about the concession agreement, they will likely receive an uncontested,
positive gloss on the terms because the government officials and the
concessionaire company, as the only parties privy to the negotiations, have a
near monopoly on information and a bully pulpit for spinning the information.
Finally, even where members of the public do obtain information about the
proposed concession at a stage prior to enactment, actors who are not a party to
the negotiations retain little ability to influence the outcome. While some
international actors, such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, or
foreign governments, may have a voice because of their financing clout,4 the
government negotiators rarely confer with local stakeholders- such as the
citizens and businesses most directly affected by the plan, interest groups with
reason to oppose the plan, or other policymakers - to discuss the attractiveness,
effects, or feasibility of the plan's provisions. 4 For example, in Cochabamba,
the government did not meet with any local citizens or groups to solicit
opinions or gauge the ramifications of the plan.42 Furthermore, the insularity
of the plan's creation leaves local people or groups outside the process with
little meaningful recourse to express their apprehensions, even though their
vantage point may give them more insight into the project than those
39. Charles Santiago, Murky Figures Cloud Water Tariff Hikes: Challenges and Issues of Governance
in Water Management in Malaysia, ALIRAN MONTHLY, Issue No. 11/12, at 29-30 (2005)
(Malay.), available at http://www.aliran.com/oldsite/monthly/2o05b/llf.html.
40. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
41. For an excellent discussion of just such a problem in the La Paz and El Alto water
concession, see Andrea Kramer, Conflict Sources in La Paz and El Alto, 33 DEv. &
COOPERATION 332, 332-35 (2006) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.inwent.org/E+7/
content/archive-eng/o8-2oo6/focLart5.html. As she explains, "The local governments of El
Alto and La Paz were not involved in negotiations, nor was their public utility SAMAPA.
The concession was thus awarded without participation by the key stakeholders. The
population was also excluded from the discussion on whether and how privatisation could
be achieved." Id. at 333.
42. See Matthias Finger, The New Water Paradigm: The Privatization of Governance and the
Instrumentalization of the State, in THE BUSINESS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE
275, 286-89 (David L. Levy & Peter J. Newell eds., 2005).
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negotiating its terms.43 Thus, as with traditional bilateral contracts, outsiders
have no influence over or knowledge about concession agreements during the
process of their creation.
In sum, concessionaires and participating government officials enact
concession agreements as traditional bilateral contracts. Part II establishes how
this contractual creation procedure undermines the stability and success of
concession agreements.
II. FROM INSULAR CREATION TO NEGATIVE POLICY OUTCOMES
This Part connects concession agreements' contractual creation method to
negative policy outcomes. The way that the parties create and treat concessions
undermines the potential for effective and stable agreements.
A. Making Inefficient Choices: Corruption, Timing, and Tariffs
The current method of creating concession agreements undermines their
effectiveness and stability by inducing officials to make inefficient choices. The
insular process provides an increased opportunity for malignant corruption,
short-term prioritization that undermines long-term gain, and nonoptimal
levels of tariff creation.
1. Personal Gain
First, the conditions that surround the creation of concession agreements
are highly conducive to corruption, exhibiting three of five key causes of
corruption identified by the World Bank: lack of institutional restraints, lack of
transparency of actors, and lack of general accountability." In the context of
43. See, e.g., id.
44. Institutional restraints, such as a system of checks and balances or of separation of powers,
could reduce corruption by limiting what governmental actors can do and punishing them if
they do not act within these prescribed limitations. Conversely, government power
unrestrained by such checks creates corruption. A lack of transparency leads to corruption
because citizens cannot discover the corrupt practices or prove that they are taking place.
Finally, lack of accountability induces corruption because it means that people never have to
answer (whether financially, politically, or criminally) for their corrupt practices. See World
Bank, Anti-Corruption, http://www.worldbank.org/anticorruption (last visited Oct. 30,
2007); see also Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes, Consequences, Scope, and
Cures, 45 IMF STAFF PAPERS 559, 569 (1998), available at http://idari.cu.edu.tr/
igunes/butce/makalebutce29.pdf (noting that in situations where officials "have discretion
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this Note, corruption may be defined as a quid pro quo exchange of the award
of a concession agreement for the personal financial benefit of the government
official awarding the concession.
4
1
The current method by which concession agreements are created does not
contain effective institutional restraints on key actors: there often exists no
clear procedure that governments must follow to select concessionaires and
negotiate agreements, or there exist only formal constraints, which officials and
concessionaires may easily circumvent by decrees, fast-tracking proposals, or
ignoring requirements. 46 This absence of restraints allows governments to
make inefficient determinations at various steps of the process: for example in
deciding whether and with whom to enter into concession agreements, and
what terms to include in the agreements. In the case of the Cochabamba
concession, the Bolivian Times accused the government of corruption, claiming
that government officials chose the local concessionaire, ICE Ingenieros, based
on the political connections of the owner, and that because of these connections
the government was willing to omit crucial contract components and to
overlook irregularities throughout negotiation and early implementation.
47
Furthermore, the creation and implementation of concession agreements
lacks transparency, as executive government officials and concessionaires
conduct each step in insulated groups outside of the legislature and without
others' awareness or input. Where executive government officials and
concessionaires create the agreements through a procedure invisible to the
public, and stakeholding groups have no influence over, or even knowledge of,
the terms of the agreement before enactment, the government actor may
exclude or include terms in the contract that personally benefit him (or include
terms in exchange for a direct payment) without fear of discovery. 48 For
over important decisions ... corruption, including high-level or political corruption, can
play a major role").
45. The definition used here adheres most closely to the common political science definition of
corruption as "efforts to secure wealth or power through illegal means." Seymour Martin
Lipset & Gabriel Salman Lenz, Corruption, Culture, and Markets, in CULTURE MATTERS:
How VALUES SHAPE HUMAN PROGRESS 112, 112 (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P.
Huntington eds., 2000). It is also compatible with the economic definition of corruption as
"an act in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that
contravenes the rules of the game." Toke S. Aidt, Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey,
ECON. J., Nov. 2003, at F632, F632.
46. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
47. See ELIZABETH PEREDO BELTRAN, HEINRICH BOLL FOUND., WATER, PRIVATIZATION AND
CONFLICT: WOMEN FROM THE COCHABAMBA VALLEY 21-22 (2004); Lobina, supra note 15, at
59; Nickson & Vargas, supra note 1, at 135 n.9.
48. See Tanzi, supra note 44, at 574.
117:510 2007
CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
example, former Malaysian Finance Minister Daim Zainuddin allegedly
awarded the Cheras toll concession to the company Syarikat Teratai K.G.Sdn
Bhd,4 9 which had agreed to set the location and amount of tolls to assure the
Minister's profit, even though the company had only two employees and later
had to create a subsidiary company to carry out the concession. Nearly twenty
years later, at the urging of persistent nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), the details of the concession award are only now finally emerging."0
Finally, concessionaires and many executive government officials escape
accountability because they do not face popular election. And, though some
government officials involved will technically be accountable through elections,
the opaqueness of the concession process prevents the public from discovering
their corruption. Without any true accountability, concessionaires and
government officials are free to exchange quid pro quo payments without fear
of direct retribution from the populace."1
Thus the extralegislative, opaque process by which concession agreements
are created lacks institutional restraints, transparency, and accountability.
These deficiencies induce corrupt choices that create inefficient policy
outcomes by trading benefits to consumers for personal benefits.5 2
2. Nearsightedness
Concession agreements provide a particularly acute incentive for
government officials to take short-term over long-term benefits because the
agreements last much longer than a leader's time in office. Concession
agreements often last twenty to fifty years, whereas presidential terms are
generally set at four to ten years." As a result, a leader faces an enormous
political incentive to structure a concession agreement so that the greatest
benefits accrue during the period of time she is in power, and she receives the
49. This company later renamed itself Metramac Corp. Sdn Bhd. Kim Quek, Metramac Scandal:
No Light at the End of the Tunnel, MALAYSIA TODAY, Jan. 20, 2006, http://malaysia
-today.net/reports/2006/o1/metramac-scandal-no-light-at-end-of.htm.
50. Id.
51. However, there may be indirect electoral accountability for corruption insofar as leaders may
be held responsible for projects that fail. See infra Section II.B.
52. In addition, corruption necessarily involves an inefficient transfer because the payment is
given to the government official for not acting, rather than being directed toward
economically productive activities.
s3. For example, the Buenos Aires road concession term is twenty-two years and eight months,
the Panama port concession term is twenty years, and the Mexico railway concession term is
fifty years. Shaw et al., supra note 33, app. at 49, 66, 72.
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credit for the benefits to society that stem from the agreement. s4 For example,
throughout the 198os, the Mexican government signed a series of toll road
concessions (covering more than 4000 miles of road), with one of the most
important selection criteria being the length of time that it would take for the
toll roads to earn a positive return. The government official in charge
privileged concessionaires who stated they could provide positive returns most
quickly over those who had a more long-term focus."5
A calculating leader will also construct the agreement so that its costs only
become evident after she has left office. This common strategy would allow the
leader to receive adulation for the program's success while she is in office,
while her successor receives the blame and has to solve the new problems that
arise later.
s6
The extralegislative, insulated manner of creating concession agreements
heightens the incentive for short-term gain in two ways. First, as mentioned
above, the insular process provides no checks on the government official from
groups - such as citizen groups, NGOs, or legislators - that may have longer-
term goals and concerns than the president." Second, the construction of these
agreements may increase the incentive for short-term benefits by further
politicizing the agreement and concentrating the political risks and rewards. If
many actors were involved in its creation, the agreement might be viewed as a
joint project and the often large political costs of an unsuccessfil concession
agreement (or the benefits of a successful agreement) would be distributed
among them. In contrast, because one government official is the only person
54. See R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 29 (1990).
s5. Shaw et al., supra note 33, at 26. This incentive to skew the structure of costs and benefits is
heightened by the initial time period in which lump sum payments and inducements are
offered to the government compared to when the costs of the agreement would come into
place. See, e.g., Lobina, supra note 15, at 75 fig.3 (citing the increasing water cost to
consumers over the course of the Buenos Aires concession); id. at 79 (referencing the
viewpoint that initial pricing failures have later led to the need for "excessive and
nontransparent subsidization" to meet escalating costs). While democratic accountability
would not in and of itself ameliorate this pernicious short-term focus, it would introduce
new actors into the system (for example, citizens' groups) who have a much longer time
horizon than the president.
56. See ARNOLD, supra note 54, at 29 (recognizing that citizens "are far more likely to detect
early-order effects than later-order effects"). This strategy assumes and takes advantage of
the fact that most individuals will be unlikely to trace the concession agreement's outcome
back to leaders who have left office. To the extent that this is true, the leader structuring the
concession agreement does not even face a threat to her legacy.
s. See supra Part I; see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (discussing the potential for
corruption where concession agreements are created and implemented by executive officials
outside of the legislature and without others' awareness or input).
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(or one of very few people) involved, her political fortunes are directly and
singularly tied to the short-term failure or success of the agreement, which
increases her incentive to favor short-term benefits."s In turn, the official's
prioritization of short-term gain over long-term efficiency may destabilize the
agreement by provoking the ire of the local populace when the benefits
suddenly decrease and the costs increase. s9
3. Rate and Fee Adjustments
Finally, the extralegislative, antidemocratic system by which parties create
concession agreements undermines efficient outcomes because it
disincentivizes optimal adjustments to the rates and fees charged by
concessionaires, pushing government officials either away from approving
necessary adjustments or toward allowing any proposed increase.
Concessionaires in certain areas, such as infrastructure, service, or goods
provision, predominately recuperate their investment through income from
rates charged to consumers (for example, road tolls or utility rates).
Additionally, the government may initially supplement the concessionaire's
income with a monetary or resource payment to help cover start-up costs or
6oincentivize investment. As a result of this arrangement, when the
concessionaire fails to turn a profit, or fails to reach a projected income margin,
it will push for an increase in the rates or the government support.6i In
extraordinary circumstances or when terms of the concession agreement limit
rate increases, concessionaires will push to renegotiate the contract
58. For one stark example of this phenomenon, see infra note 75 and accompanying text.
59. See infra Section II.B for a complete discussion of the pernicious effects of popular
opposition to a concession agreement.
6o. See Lobina, supra note 1S, at 64-65 (discussing investment incentives and subsidization of
concessionaires through the indexation of currency and reduction of operating risks); id. at
79 (stating that subsidies "are now seen as a key to sustain the presence of the private sector
in developing countries").
61. David Haarmeyer & Ashoka Mody, Tapping the Private Sector: Approaches to Managing Risk
in Water and Sanitation, J. PROJECT FIN., Summer 1998, at 7, 16-19, 22 (recognizing that if
more investment is required than was expected in the initial tariff determination and if tariff
renegotiation is costly, private developers and investors may find that contractually agreed-
upon returns are insufficient).
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altogether.6 2 These increases and renegotiations often prove necessary to
ensure the continued economic viability of the project.6"
Naturally, government officials will always face some political incentives to
reject a price raise or payout once the concession is in place. The current
process by which governments create concession agreements, however, can
significantly exacerbate these incentives. First, because they have control over
information during the extralegislative, insular negotiation and enactment,64
and because they face fewer forces opposing the agreement prior to
enactment, 6s government officials are more likely to present a uniformly
favorable picture of the project's benefits while understating the level of price
increases necessary to maintain its viability. 66 Second, because of the
aforementioned political risks and incentive for short-term benefits, and
because the government officials face no opposing forces as they would in a
legislative or consultative process, government officials may more easily set the
initial rates artificially low, which in turn expands the size of the tariff increase
that must eventually take place.6 7 Both overly favorable publicity and
unsustainably low initial rates exacerbate the negative political consequences of
raising the prices or payouts to necessary levels. Leaders are therefore often
very resistant to allowing tariff increases and sometimes pointedly refuse to do
so. As J. Luis Guasch and his coauthors note, it is a "[t]ypical scenario" for a
government "during a re-election campaign [to decide] in a unilateral fashion
to cut tariffs or not to honor agreed tariff increases to secure popular
support."68 This can have particularly deleterious consequences, as the
government's refusal to renegotiate tariffs destabilizes the agreement both
financially and politically, and may cause it to be cancelled. For example, in
Manila, where the government signed two twenty-five-year water concession
agreements in the mid-199os, many argue that the government's refusal to
adjust rates to help the concessionaires recoup foreign exchange-rate losses
6a. See, e.g., J. Luis Guasch & Stphane Straub, Renegotiation of Infrastructure Concessions: An
Overview, 77 ANNALS PUB. & COOPERATIvE ECON. 479, 481 (2006).
63. See, e.g., Louis Skyner, A Viable Framework for Private Investment in the Utility Sector: An
Analysis of the 2005 RF Law on Concession Agreements, 31 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 155, 162
(2006).
64. See supra Section I.B.
65. See supra Section I.A.
66. The only other party with access to information, the concessionaire company, has the same
incentives to paint a rosy picture of the agreements.
67. See, e.g., Shaw et al., supra note 33, app. at 74, 76 (discussing the artificially low initial tolls
and then rapid rises in Mexico and Thailand).
68. Guasch et al., supra note 4, at 3.
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following the Asian financial crisis was the primary reason that the concessions
eventually fell apart.6" Because the extralegislative, insular creation of
concession agreements makes necessary rate or fee renegotiation less likely to
occur, this creation method undermines the agreements' effectiveness.
Paradoxically, however, the current process by which parties create
concession agreements will also allow government officials to make entirely
unwarranted tariff increases in certain circumstances. Specifically, the
absence of transparency 70 creates opportunities for corruption 71 that allow
the government to make any tariff increase at the behest of the
concessionaire where the benefits of corruption outweigh any possible
electoral loss created. For example, in the course of the Malaysian water
concession agreement between Syabas and the Federal and Selangor state
governments,72 which was characterized by a lack of transparency, 73 the
government officials supported a proposed fifteen percent price increase that
would provide the concessionaires with a windfall profit of 5o to 6o million
Malaysian ringgit (roughly $14.3 to $17 million), though the increase was
unconnected to the project's viability.74
B. Provoking, Ignoring, and Exacerbating Opposition
Regardless of the merits of the agreement, a concession agreement will
invariably engender some local opposition from three different groups:
political and business groups that have a vested interest in the agreement's
failure; citizens who are hesitant about the agreement on ideological or
nationalist grounds; and people who have become dependent on the state-run
system. However, the extralegislative, insular method by which concessionaires
and government officials create concession agreements provokes, ignores, and
aggravates each of these sources of opposition. This opposition threatens the
agreements' stability and success.
First, concession agreements naturally engender opposition from groups
that have a political or financial interest in the agreements' collapse.
Opposition political parties want the agreements to fail because they will
69. See, e.g., Slattery, supra note 5; see also Guasch et al., supra note 4 (discussing this
phenomenon throughout Latin America).
70. See supra notes 44, 47-50 and accompanying text.
1. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 39 and accompanying text for a more detailed description of this concession.
73. See, e.g., Santiago, supra note 39, at 30.
74. See id.
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benefit electorally from backlash. This happened in 1999 when the citizens of
Panama elected President Mireya Moscoso on a platform of renationalization
and nonprivatization, after President E. Ernesto Prez Balladares's attempts to
privatize the telecommunications and railway industries failed to achieve
desired efficiency benefits and were plagued by financial and political
scandals.75 Two major groups may have a financial interest in the breakdown of
concession agreements. Competing companies not initially chosen for the
concession, and the local consortiums affiliated with them, may oppose the
concession agreement's success because a collapse could provide them with an
opportunity to take over the concession agreement or eliminate the first-mover
advantage obtained by the initial concessionaire in securing future agreements
with the country. 76 In addition, local businesspeople affiliated with the state or
municipal entity that previously operated in the area of the concession, or
otherwise financially benefited from the existing arrangement, will oppose the
concession agreement because they will lose business. For example, in Bolivia,
local water providers, which included truck vendors, small cooperatives, and
neighborhood associations and companies that drilled private wells, were
opposed to the Cochabamba concession from the outset because they feared
being put out of business by a concessionaire who was given exclusive water
rights.77
The extralegislative, insular method by which concessionaires and
executive government officials create concession agreements exacerbates this
natural opposition from political and business interests in several ways. First,
governmental failure to consult with oppositional groups or groups harmed by
the project makes those groups feel marginalized. 78 The groups will likely feel
shut out of the process, and they will, in turn, be even less likely to think of the
agreement as legitimate-and to accept it without violence. Second, when
government officials fail to meet with business interests who might stand to
lose from the agreement, they are less likely to attempt to reach an amicable
solution, or one that allows these businesses to stay in business even for a short
7s. See Marco A. Gandasegui, The 1998 Referendum in Panama: A Popular Vote Against
Neoliberalism, 26 LATIN AM. PERSPS. 159, 159-68 (1999); Panama: Mireya Moscoso Promises
Shift in Priorities as She Begins Her Presidency, NoTICEN: CENT. AM. & CARIBBEAN AFF., Sept.
9, 1999, http://www.allbusiness.com/central-america/303576-1.html.
76. For a further discussion of the concept of the first mover advantage in concessions, see
Jonathan P. Doh, Entrepreneurial Privatization Strategies: Order of Entry and Local Partner
Collaboration as Sources of Competitive Advantage, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 551, 556-57 (2000).
77. Nickson & Vargas, supra note i, at 141-42.
78. See, e.g., Finger, supra note 42, at 289.
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transition period, which could substantially mitigate their opposition.79
Finally, as mentioned above, when parties fail to pass the agreements through
any legislative (or otherwise openly deliberative) process, and thereby
negotiate with opposing political forces, concession agreements become further
politicized and explicitly tied to the leader in power at the time of enactment.
As a result, this method of creation provides the opposing party with an
increased incentive to slander the project and to stoke opposition among the
populace wherever possible.8o
Second, even individuals who stand to gain from concession agreements
may be skeptical of them on ideological grounds. Citizens of countries with a
long history of state-run industries may believe that states inherently provide
better services.8' They may be opposed to promoting investment from large,
often foreign, companies over local investment, either to protect local
businesses or because of fears that the profits will leave the country. They also
may fear that companies are more interested in their financial bottom line than
providing good services at a fair price and in an equitable manner to all
citizens. 82 All three of these concerns existed in Bolivia, where, despite the
promise that private sector investment would provide a long-term solution to
the abysmal water situation by improving the efficiency and accessibility of
water service, many Bolivians initially were hesitant because "for many
Bolivians, the new law and concession contract together symbolized all that
was wrong with the neo-liberal development strategy.
8
,
79. ERIc M. PATASHNIK, AFTER POLICY REFORM: SUSTAINING GENERAL-INTEREST VICTORIES IN
AMERICAN GoVERNMENT (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 285-86, on file with The Yale
Law Journal) (discussing whether transition payments effectively mitigate opposition).
80. Because the local population is also inflamed, this method may provide an excellent
recruitment and motivational tool for the local opposition. In Bolivia, the Civic Committee
(Comite Civico) and a more radical group, Coordination of Water and Life (Coordinadora
del Agua y de la Vida), which was formed only after the adoption of the concession
agreement, were able to organize the populace against the agreement. Nickson & Vargas,
supra note 1, at 143.
81. For a critique of "the neoliberal line that 'private is better,'" see Jim Schultz, In the Andes,
Echoes of Seattle, GLOBAL POL'Y F., Mar. 23, 2000, http://www.globalpolicy.org/
security/natres/water/2000/0323coch.htm. As Schultz argues, in the Bolivian case, "the more
obvious results have been ... increases in prices, and reductions in services." Id.
82. See Gregory Palast, New British Empire of the Damned, OBSERVER (London), Apr. 23, 2000,
Business Section, at 4, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Columnists/Column/
o,,213159,oo.html ("[W]hen a monopoly operator gets its fist around a city's water spigots,
it can pump the funds for capital projects from captive customers rather than
shareholders.").
83. Nickson & Vargas, supra note i, at 139.
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Once again, the extralegislative, insular process by which executive
government officials and concessionaires create concession agreements
exacerbates natural opposition -this time on the part of ideologically skeptical
local citizens. The failure to release background information about the
candidate companies and how the government chooses the "best"
concessionaire may fuel skepticism about whether either party is interested in
equity, especially when opposing groups exploit the information gap to slur the
parties' motives.84 Furthermore, the government's failure to release
information about the concessionaires under consideration and the
concessionaire's lack of contact with local populations will undoubtedly fuel
the perception that the concessionaire does not care about local people or their
apprehensions and that it is, indeed, only concerned with its bottom line.
Finally, the process by which parties create concession agreements may
increase local opposition to the agreements because it fails to recognize and
address local dependency on the current system. Local citizens often develop a
comprehensive system of practices around the status quo, regardless of its
inefficiencies. Over time, this system becomes a deeply entrenched network of
practices, norms, and values. For example, in the city of Cochabamba, where
the municipal water company, SEMAPA, was only able to provide water to
fifty-seven percent of the population, town members grew to rely on an
elaborate patchwork of local tanker-based water vendors or sank their own
wells and made their own water storage tanks.8 s In smaller farming
communities surrounding the city, people used underground water resources
for irrigation and used an informal, communitarian ownership model that had
been in place for generations.86 Any concession agreement that changes the
status quo will undoubtedly engender some opposition, even where it would
create a more efficient system, because it means that people will have to change
longstanding behavioral patterns.8"
Extralegislative, insularly constructed concession agreements again
heighten this natural local opposition because they fail to acknowledge
properly and transition from the entrenched system. Because the government
84. See, e.g., Finger, supra note 42, at 287-88 (discussing how groups opposing the Cochabamba
agreement, such as Coordinadora del Agua y de la Vida, were able to use the information
gap to impute nefarious motives to the government and concessionaire).
85. Susan Spronk, Moving from Protest to Proposal in Cochabamba, Bolivia: "Social Control"
as an Alternative to the Privatization of Urban Water Systems 13 (June 3, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.aguabolivia.org/fe/ControlSocial/
spronk.pdf.
86. Id.
87. For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see William Samuelson & Richard
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 9-10 (1988).
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and concessionaires do not meet with local individuals and groups, they do not
understand the practices in place or local people's attachment to them. Thus,
the resulting agreement will be less likely to integrate existing local practices or
to transition effectively from them, which will stoke local anger, both because it
forces people to change their practices and because its planners appear not to
care about the population.88 In Bolivia, the concession agreement provided
immediate, exclusive rights to Aguas del Tunari for the provision of water
services.89 Although this clause preserved the economic viability of the project
and the overall quality of water production, it stoked intense anger because it
meant that people could no longer use their self-constructed wells free of cost;
low-income households had none of their usual water vendor options until
they were connected to the Aguas del Tunari network; and local farmers feared
they would be charged for water used for irrigation.9°
The sum total of opposition from these three local groups is particularly
detrimental to the ultimate success and stability of an agreement. Strong local
opposition to the agreement may incite the populace to refuse to pay the tariffs
or tariff increases. 9' Inability to collect tariffs may ultimately undermine the
financial viability of the concession and lead to its cancellation. Furthermore,
the strong joint opposition of political parties, local business interests, and local
citizens may lead to a coordinated cycle of increasingly vociferous and
sometimes violent acts of opposition to the plan. In Bolivia, the tariff increase,
combined with the forced change in practices and stoked by newly established
local opposition groups such as Coordinadora del Agua y de la Vida, led to
massive protests in the streets, and ultimately rioting and the deaths of several
protesters. 92 Large-scale, mobilized opposition will almost invariably lead to
the cancellation of the concession agreement.
This Part has argued that the current contractual method of concession
agreement creation undermines the agreements' success and stability in two
major ways. First, the absence of transparency and the incentive structure in
the concession creation procedure induce officials to make inefficient policies
such as selecting terms that benefit themselves personally, trading away long-
term stability for short-term gain, and failing to make necessary and efficient
rate and fee adjustments. Second, the insularity of the contractual creation
88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
89. Nickson &Vargas, supra note 1, at 141.
9o. BELTRAN, supra note 47, at 25; Nickson & Vargas, supra note 1, at 137-43.
91. See Slattery, supra note 5 (discussing opposition to rate increases in the Manila concession).
92. See, e.g., Nickson &Vargas, supra note 1, at 137.
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process both ignores and exacerbates local opposition to the agreement. Part III
presents a solution to these problems.
III. RECONSTRUCTING CONCESSION AGREEMENTS AS PUBLIC POLICY
Concession agreements should be treated as public policy mechanisms
rather than private contracts because they involve subject matters critical to the
populations, they are created by political leaders who profess to effect wide-
scale public change, and they substantially constrain the future development of
the nation. Academics, officials, and other interested parties should use this
new conceptual framework to push for procedural reforms that bring the
method of creation into line with the actual public policy nature of the
agreements. These procedural reforms will create more stable and effective
concession agreements, by increasing transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness.
A. Reconceptualizing Concession Agreements as Matters of Public Policy
Interested parties should reconceptualize concession agreements
theoretically as matters of public policy because of their subject matter, their
focus on producing public outcomes, and their effects on future development.
i. Critical Subject Matter
Parties should conceive of concession agreements as public policy matters,
rather than merely as bilateral contracts between private parties, because of the
public-oriented subjects of the agreements. Concession agreements often focus
on basic necessities, natural resources, and infrastructural issues, all of which
deeply affect a large number of people and lie at the heart of what most
consider as public goods.
The agreements for the production, purification, and delivery of water,
such as those in Cochabamba, 93 Buenos Aires,9 4 and Manila,9s and the often
93. For a detailed description of the substance of the Cochabamba water concession, see supra
notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
94. For a detailed description of the substance of the Buenos Aires water concession, see Lorena
Alcfzar, Manuel A. Abdala & Mary M. Shirley, The Buenos Aires Water Concession (World





integrated agreements for sewerage and sewage treatment, are typical examples
of concession agreements dealing with basic necessities. 6 These agreements
establish public policy most obviously because they are crucially important for
the populace. For example, the Cochabamba water concession would, in
theory, have provided potable water to over ninety-five percent of the people in
the city by 2019, and ensured that virtually every household had connections to
sewerage by 2034.97 The Buenos Aires water concession was projected to
provide water and sewerage to 584,250 new households (which accounts for
over seventy-five percent of the municipal area's impoverished households) in
its first five years.98 And the Manila agreement intended to provide water
coverage to virtually all eleven million of the city's residents. 99 These
agreements thus qualify as public policy because they address topics "of
fundamental concern to the state and the whole of society." '°
Moreover, concession agreements establish public policy because they focus
on less commoditized subjects than those of most private commercial
contracts. Rather than being viewed as a market good, populations throughout
the world view goods such as water as fundamentally public.'"' People often
view access to these goods as a basic human right of all citizens that forms part
of the social contract with the government.0 2 For example, the United Nations
95. For a description of both the substance and effects of the Manila concession agreement, see
Lobina, supra note 15, at 62-64, 68, 71.
96. The 1993 Buenos Aires concession agreement, for example, was set to expend $1.29 billion
on water provision and sewerage and sewage treatment within the first five years. See id. at
63 tbl.3. In addition, another recent concession agreement- the twenty-five-year concession
agreement between Vivendi and the Philippine government to provide water services for
Manila- includes a provision for a $35 million sewerage treatment facility in Fort Bonifacio,
a new business district on the outskirts of Manila. See HALL ET AL., supra note 1S, at 8.
97. Nickson & Vargas, supra note 1, at 136 tbl.2. This is particularly important because,
according to the 1992 census, Bolivia had among the lowest access to crucial water services
in the region, with only seventy-five percent of the urban population having household
water connections and thirty-six percent having sewerage connections. Id. at 130.
98. See Alcizar et al., supra note 94, at 16.
99. See Carla A. Montemayor, The Manila Water Privatization Fiasco and the Role of Suez
Lyonnaise/Ondeo: Presentation at the Summit for Another World 1-2 (May 20, 2003),
http://www.tni.org/altreg-docs/manila.pdf.
too. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1267 (8th ed. 2004).
1o1. See Tim Kessler, From Social Contract to Private Contracts: The Privatisation of Health,
Education and Basic Infrastructure, in SOCIAL WATCH REPORT 2003: THE POOR AND THE
MARKET 11, 11 (2003), available at http://unpani.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/
documents/APCITY/UNPANo1O129.pdf.
102. Id. at 11-12; see International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3,1976).
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International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, signed by
145 countries, declares access to life-sustaining services such as potable water to
be a "fundamental right" and binds signatories to promote access to safe water
"equitably and without discrimination.""0 3 Because the subjects of concession
agreements are less commoditized items often considered basic human rights
and the agreements deeply affect many citizens, concession agreements fit this
Note's definition of public policy.
0 4
Second, concession agreements often focus on natural resources.
Agreements for the extraction of resources, such as a recent agreement for the
"exploration, exploitation and transport" of oil in the Chari-Ouest and Largeau
basins of Chad' or concessions for foresting and logging such as those in
Cameroon"°6 and Indonesia'0 7 are typical examples. Concession agreements in
this area represent public policy matters for several reasons. Like basic
necessities, natural resources such as oil and forests are often considered public
goods,"os whose maintenance and use affect many people.'0 9 The distribution
103. Kessler, supra note lol, at 11.
104. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
105. Energem Resources signed a renewable concession agreement for oil and gas "exploration,
exploitation and transport" in the Chari-Ouest and Largeau basins in Chad on October 16,
2004. It was approved by presidential decree on December 8, 2004. Chad Upstream Oil
Concession Awarded to Energem, EXPLORATION: NEWS FOR OIL & GAS AND HYDROCARBON
INDUSTRIES, Dec. io, 2004, http://www.gulfoilandgas.com/webprol/main/mainnews
.asp?id= 1049.
1o6. In Cameroon, logging concessions cover seventy-six percent of the forest area, and over fifty
percent of that land is governed by abandoned concessions. John A. Gray, Forest Concession
Policies and Revenue Systems: Country Experience and Policy Changes for Sustainable Tropical
Forestry 8 (World Bank, Technical Paper No. 522, 2002).
107. In 1998, the 427 forest concessions in Indonesia accounted for fifty-three percent of the total
wood harvest, and another thirty-four percent came from land clearing as a result of related
concessions. Id.
1o8. For example, in the United States, the maintenance and provision of national parks is an
arena overseen expressly and exclusively by the federal government and shielded from
undue business encroachment based on this public rights and ownership model. See ALFRED
RUNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 260 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that
"Congress and the President alone had the power to establish national parks" and that "their
administration fell to government officials"). In countries such as Venezuela, the national
government keeps ownership over oil resources based on this model. See, e.g., Greg
Morsbach, Venezuela Gives Exxon Ultimatum, BBC NEWS, Dec. 20, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4S4439o.stm.
1o9. Indeed, the effects on individuals may be measured based on direct visitation in the case of
national parks, the effects on inhabitants of the surrounding areas in the case of forests or
national parks, the secondary effects of the use of revenue from the resources in the case of
oil or mineral reserves, and the environmental effects stemming from their use or
extractionVdestruction in the case of all of the above.
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of these resources is often geographically concentrated. This suggests they are a
matter of public policy because it implicates profound national questions of
legal ownership over these materials, and given the potential wealth to be
extracted from natural resources, decisions that allocate the benefits of the
agreement have significant distributional implications for the populace." ° Even
more seriously, when combined with ethnic geographic segregation, the
agreements can create ethnically disparate effects that lead to ethnic conflict."'
Also, when these agreements concern the extraction and refinement of
resources such as oil, they may have unforeseen detrimental health or
environmental effects on the population. For example, in one major ongoing
arbitration case, Ecuador claims that Texaco improperly handled waste, caused
several oil spills, and ruptured pipelines as part of its 1973 twenty-year mining
concession agreement, and thus massively polluted the groundwater with
carcinogenic toxins and extensively damaged local ecosystems." 2
Third and finally, concession agreements often focus on key issues of
infrastructure. Agreements to rebuild and maintain ports,' 13 construct and
operate airports, and build highways and collect tolls,"' abound. These types
of concession agreements implicate public policy questions, including
distribution of benefits, national security, and domestic control. The placement
of roads, airports, and infrastructure necessarily will have strong distributional
consequences. Areas with the improved facilities will likely receive significant
boosts in productivity, tourism, and income when compared to neighboring
11o. For more discussion on this topic, see Amy L. Chua, The Paradox of Free Market Democracy:
Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287, 287-94 (2000).
ill. See id. at 319 ("[B]y causing, maintaining, or exacerbating the disproportionate wealth of
the market dominant minority, marketization will cause, maintain, or exacerbate intense
ethnic resentment among the impoverished, indigenous majority.").
11,. Maura Mullen de Bolivar, A Comparison of Protecting the Environmental Interests of Latin
American Indigenous Communities from Transnational Corporations Under International Human
Rights and Environmental Law, 8 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 105,111-12 (1998).
113. See, for example, the concession between Shell and the government in Gujarat, India.
Concession Agreement for Development of Hazira Port Signed in Presence of Hon. Chief Minister,
GuJARAT MAR. BoARDNEWS, Apr. 22, 2002, http://www.gmbports.org/newsi.htm
(discussing the terms of the agreement).
114. See, for example, the agreement between Concorcio Aeropuertos Internationales SA and the
Government of Uruguay. Shaw et al., supra note 33, app. at 9.
115. See, for example, numerous agreements throughout Malaysia in the i98os, described in
A.R. Abdul Aziz, Privatisation of Highways in Malaysia: The Peril of Not Consulting End-Users,
INT'L J. FOR CONSTRUCTION MARKETING, Mar. 2003, http://www.brookes.ac.uk/other/
conmark/IJCM/Vol3-1/Vo13-Issue2/Papers/IJCMpaper2rashid.htm (providing detailed
analysis of the series of concession agreements to maintain highways, entered into between
the Malaysian government and private companies during the 199os).
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communities."6 Often these agreements also implicate issues such as safety and
national security that local populations properly consider issues of public
policy.1'7 Finally, where the concessionaire is not a domestic company, the
concession agreements may implicate difficult value questions about foreign
maintenance of a country's infrastructure."'
2. Purported Enactment for Public Effect
The government's ostensible focus on public welfare in concession
agreements also suggests that they should be viewed as acts of public policy.
While governments often sign concession agreements in order to reap financial
gain in the form of payment for the right or of reducing the governments'
administrative costs, governments often argue that these agreements promote
several societal welfare goals.
Governments often present these agreements to the public as a means to
redistribute and equalize resources and promise that concession agreements
will increase the poor or rural population's access to the resource directly
provided by the concession. The Bolivian government, for example, stated that
it created an earlier 1997 water concession agreement "to provide all
households in poor peri-urban neighborhoods of La Paz and El Alto with
access to high-quality water and to sewer connections," 9 and that the 1999
Cochabamba agreement sought similar goals in that municipal area. 2 ' In the
best cases, these promises gain substance through direct, enforced provisions
within the agreements themselves. For example, a concession agreement for
116. See John Gibson & Scott Rozelle, Poverty and Access to Roads in Papua New Guinea, 52 ECON.
DEv. & CULTURAL CHANGE 159 (2003) (providing an excellent case study to demonstrate the
strong inverse relationship between access to roads and poverty).
117. See, for example, Stephen E. Flynn, Port Security Is Still a House of Cards, FARE. ECON. REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 5, for a detailed analysis of the national security implications of port
control.
i1s. This national security concern may even extend beyond the two parties involved in the
concession and provoke opposition to the concession agreement from a third party. For
example, U.S. officials opposed a port concession agreement between a Chinese company
and the government of the Panama on the grounds that it would provide hostile interests
with access to U.S. waterways. The Panama Canal and United States Interests: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 1oth Cong. 7-10 (1998) (statement of Adm. Thomas H.
Moorer, Former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff).
iig. Kristen Komives, Designing Pro-Poor Water and Sewer Concessions: Early Lessons from Bolivia 1
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2243, 1999), available at
http ://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/waterandsanitation/resources/pdf-files/Komives-
Bolivia.pdf.
12o. Nickson &Vargas, supra note i, at 135-37.
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road construction in Bogoti, Colombia, successfully required the
concessionaire to build a road to connect the poorer nearby town of Caqueza to
the capital city, and a concession agreement for Brazilian railways required the
concessionaire to employ a workforce of 18oo local people at all times.' Even
when governments do include such terms, however, the terms may simply
serve public relations purposes, and the governments may either not even
threaten enforcement or else give in and allow the concessionaire to abandon
the terms when they prove unprofitable.'22
Officials also claim to create some concession agreements to enhance the
quality or efficiency of goods and services available to the area's population.
Governments often seek concession agreements in industries where the
government struggles to provide the good or service to the public and private
corporations have more technological expertise and a track record of success.2 3
In other words, the governments profess to seek a replacement provider to
offer a public service. Again, the government may even make this purpose
explicit in its criteria for qualified bidders. For example, in Bogoti, the
government detailed the existing traffic problems and asked prospective
bidders to submit their particular ideas to create an integrated, efficient, and
improved transportation system for the entire city. 4
Some concession agreements often theoretically seek to advance public
goals because they cap the price of goods and services. While many agreements
contain no provisions of the sort, some agreements limit or remove the
company's ability to set the goods prices, especially in transportation and
infrastructure service agreements. For example, the concession for the Bangkok
121. See Shaw et al., supra note 33, app. at 50, 91.
122. For example, the Manila water concession agreement explicitly required the concessionaire
to expand coverage of water supply, sewerage, and sanitation services to cover eighty-five
percent of the population by 2001 and ninety-six percent by 2006, to provide twenty-four-
hour water supply to all connections by June 2000, to maintain a set level of water pressure
by 2007, and to meet water purity standards. See Cristina C. David, MWSS Privatization:
Implications on the Price of Water, the Poor and the Environment (Phil. Instit. for Dev. Studies,
Discussion Paper Series No. 2000-14, 2000), http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ris/pdf/
pidsdpsooi4.pdf. The concessionaire failed to meet any of these benchmarks, yet faced no
repercussions.
123. This often happens in telecommunication concession agreements or infrastructure building
agreements. For example, when Jordan sought to find private management for its telephone
industry, it did so because the government simply could not keep up with the current
demand. It provided service to only about seven percent of households, and the waiting list
for a new telephone line was nine years long. Mohammad A. Mustapha,
Telecommunications in Jordan: Performance, Policy Environment and Reforms Ahead
(May 12-17, 1997), available at http://www.worldbank.org/mdf/mdfi/perform.htm.
124. See Shaw et al., supra note 33, at 30.
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Transit System states that fares may increase only once every eighteen months,
requires that the government negotiate rate increases, and gives the
government veto power over proposals. 12 The agreements may also explicitly
cap the price of a good or service. For example, economic development
specialists Melissa Houskamp and Nicola Tynan studied fifteen concession
agreements and found that seven of the fifteen set top connection prices,
capped tariff levels, or both."6 However, as discussed above, government
officials may initially set these price caps artificially low and then allow
unmitigated increases, or refuse to allow any increases, either way maximizing
benefit to themselves while undermining the efficacy of the agreement.'
7
Whether the concession agreements actually seek to advance the lot of the
affected population or merely advance a public relations strategy, the professed
focus on effecting change for the population demonstrates that the agreements
are a matter of public policy.
3. Effective Constraints Placed on Future Policy Determinations
Interested parties should conceptually recast concession agreements as
matters of public policy, rather than merely as bilateral contracts between
private parties, because the agreements affect the countries' future welfare
policies by constraining, shaping, and determining future policy. Concession
agreements formally constrain the choices of future actors in the areas
surrounding the original concession agreement. Unlike most enacted laws,
which allow an administration, legislature, or populace that disagrees with the
policy to revoke it fairly easily, concession agreements must legally remain in
force for the length of the agreement, often thirty to fifty years, or else the
government must make severance payments to the corporation. ' As a result,
concession agreements formally constrain government policy long after the
agreements' original governmental signatory has left office or retired. Thus,
the concession agreement essentially leaves the future government with only
125. Id. at 8 box 2.
126. Melissa Houskamp & Nicola Tynan, Review of PPI Projects To Identify Potentially "Pro-
Poor" and "Anti-Poor" Provisions 9 (May 31-June 2, 2000) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.ppiaf.org/conference/sectioni-paper5.pdf.
127. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
128. Most agreements contain an arbitration clause or a liquidated damages clause so that if the
agreement is breached, the nonbreaching party, generally the company, receives damages.
There are, however, two notable exceptions to the binding, binary nature of such
agreements. First, some agreements contain buyout clauses whereby the government can




two choices in the area governed by the concession if it cannot renegotiate the
agreement; it must either continue with its portion of the agreement-
regardless of the changed circumstances or uncalculated costs that may now
make the agreement unnecessary, unprofitable, inefficient, or bad
distributional policy- or violate the agreement and pay damages.
Concession agreements also indirectly dictate future policy options by
constraining the choices of actors in the economic sectors surrounding the
original concession agreement. Concession agreements may lock in a policy
that commands resources so as effectively to preclude the pursuit of alternative
policies. For example, although the terms of a toll road concession may not
expressly forbid the government from building alternative roads, often the
terms of the concession agreement heavily discourage it by containing a
guarantee from the government to the concessionaire of minimum road traffic
and toll income. '29 Similarly, although an oil supply concession may not
prohibit the government from developing alternative energy sources,
concession agreements that guarantee concessionaires a minimum level of
crude oil sales (with government payment for missed targets) will dissuade the
government from pursuing such a strategy.13°
Concession agreements may constrain future policy more broadly by
influencing the course of economic development. Concession agreements do
not act only in the localized context surrounding the agreement. Instead, they
can control the engine of economic development. They may, in effect, allocate
the economic growth focus to one industry or economic sector, thereby
determining distribution of resources between industries. For example,
129. In other words, the government will be unlikely to pursue any strategy that would divert
traffic from the toll road because it would be forced to pay the concessionaire if the toll
income fell. Thus, it will perpetuate the concessionaire's local monopoly. See Andr&s
G6mez-Lobo & Sergio Hinojosa, Broad Roads in a Thin Country: Infrastructure Concessions in
Chile 29-30 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2279, 2000), for an
explanation of such minimum traffic and minimum income guarantees in Chile toll
concessions.
13o. For example, though early concession agreements between the Venezuelan Government and
Royal Dutch-Shell, Occidental, and Socony Mobil did not expressly preclude the
government from investing in alternatives, the revenue incentives perpetuated reliance on
oil in practice. The government received bonuses only after certain stages of development
and made revenue based on output and profit levels with revenue rising greatly with
increased oil output and use (with as much as fifty-five percent share of profits above fifty
cents per barrel and the opportunity to purchase excess at face value). See Bernard Mommer,
The New Governance of Venezuelan Oil 9 (Oxford Inst. of Energy Studies, Working Paper
No. 23, 1998), available at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/WPM23.pdf. See generally
Paul Pierson, When Effect Becomes Cause: Policy Feedback and Political Change, 45 WORLD
POL. 595 (1993) (describing how path dependency locks in suboptimal policy outcomes
because of transition costs).
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countries may use concession agreements to create infrastructure in order to
focus the economy on trade or tourism, or to build oil refineries and factories
to focus more on manufacturing or labor. The concession agreement may also
shape the spread of economic development throughout the populace by
determining geographic, socioeconomic, and ethnic distribution of
developmental benefits.'3' Finally, concession agreements may affect future
policy by transitioning into increased marketization, privatization, or both. The
"carrot" of temporary transfer of power from the government to private
industry often induces competition within the industry'32 and may soften
ideological opposition to a broader market-based strategy of development.
Furthermore, if effective, the agreement may serve as a stepping stone toward a
large-scale policy of increased privatization by displaying the virtues of private
goods and service delivery and by making it particularly difficult for the
government to regain a foothold on the provision of goods and services in the
areas surrounding the agreement.'33 Thus, the formal and informal influences
that concession agreements may have on future policies, both locally and
generally, establish these concession agreements as matters of public policy.
B. Constructing Procedural Reforms from Recasting Concession Agreements
While the previous Section argued for reconceptualizing concession
agreements as matters of public policy, this Section argues that academics,
legislators, and other interested parties should apply this reconceptualization to
pressure executive government officials and concessionaires into procedural
reforms that would bring the method and venue of concession agreements'
creation into congruence with their public policy nature. This Section focuses
on two procedural reforms: government-implemented deliberative
consideration and local consultation by concessionaires. It goes on to explain
the feasibility of the procedural reforms and argue that the reforms will
131. As noted in Subsection III.A.i, different types and locations of concession agreements have
different implications for the distribution of economic development across the country.
132. For example, companies may begin to do business in peripheral areas in the potential host
country or otherwise compete to demonstrate their viability and desirability as
concessionaires.
133. This was likely the case in Chile, for example, as concession agreements in the 197os and
198os led the government to accept-and pursue-a broader privatization strategy in other
areas. See M. Victoria Murillo, Conviction Versus Necessity: Public Utility Privatization in




enhance the viability and profitability of concession agreements by increasing
accountability, traceability, and responsiveness.'3
1. Democratic Control and Local Consultation
Conceptualizing concession agreements as traditional matters of public
policy provides a frame for interested parties to persuade executive government
officials and concessionaires to enhance democratic control over the
agreements' creation. Specifically, they can use this new understanding of
concession agreements to pressure government officials to increase openness
and deliberation in their creation and to pressure concessionaires to increase
local consultation- and thus to treat concession agreements as the public
policy measures that they truly are.
Recognizing concessions as traditional matters of public policy exposes a
disjuncture in their method of enactment. As Part I explains, the typical
creation of concession agreements as traditional bilateral contracts-in an
opaque method and insular, nondeliberative venue -directly conflicts with the
usual formation of public policy. Governments usually create measures of
public policy through a more publicly open and deliberative process, most
often in a democratically accountable legislative body,3 ' in order to realize the
benefits that stem from this method of creation."36 Most simply, parties should
not treat concession agreements so differently from other measures of public
134. It should be noted that in doing so, this Note expressly does not evaluate the merits of many
of the large-scale substantive changes to concession agreements suggested by scholars and
advocates. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
135. This venue and mode of public policy creation holds true in countries, and with regard to
similar subject matters, referenced in this Note. For example, the Philippines legislature
debated (and passed) a proposal to regulate the content of fuel and reduce dependence on
some foreign oil. The sponsor, Representative Zubiri, said: "With the eventual signing of
this bill into law, we expect investors to expedite applications for ethanol plants, thus
creating new employment for our people and in turn increasing the income for our farmers
as the demand for their produce increases." Maricel V. Cruz, Bicam Passes Biofuels Measure,
MANIIA TIMEs, Nov. 24, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.manilatimes.net/national/
20o6/nov/24/yehey/topstories/2oo 61124top2.html.
136. For a more detailed discussion of the benefits that stem from creating a public policy in an
open, deliberative process, see infra Subsection III.B.2. See also Joseph E. Stiglitz, Senior Vice
President & Chief Economist, World Bank, Oxford Amnesty Lecture: On Liberty, the Right
To Know, and Public Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life i5 (Jan. 27, 1999),
available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/jstiglitz/download/2ool-On -Liberty
_theRighttoKnow andPublic.pdf ("Public officials do have strong incentives for
secrecy. But if we are to avoid the myriad adverse political and economic consequences of
secrecy, in the design of the architecture of public institutions, we need to take this into
account: we need to force more openness than public officials might willingly offer.").
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policy that achieve a positive effect. Thus, conceiving of concession agreements
differently can help interested parties push for procedural change in their
creation.
Drawing a direct analogy to other current methods of effective
governmental policymaking and focusing on the negative effects of the current
method of creation is a more viable strategy than the traditional rights-based
advocacy because it does not dictate particular content. Existing suggestions
regarding procedural change are unlikely to be accepted by governments or
concessionaires because they use language that implicitly or explicitly advocates
substantive change in concession agreements.
Many advocates adopt a "rights-based" or "justice-based" push to change
the way concession agreements are created. For example, Publish What You
Pay, a coalition of NGOs, states that companies extracting oil and other
resources should publish their agreements because "[n]atural resources are
held in trust by the state for the citizens of a country. Those citizens have a
clear right to information .... 11137 Amnesty International calls for transparency
in the Chad-Cameroon pipeline concession agreement with an Exxon Mobil-
led consortium as a "human rights" enforcement mechanism.138 Rights- or
justice-based argument faces strong opposition, both because it shifts the focus
on benefits entirely from the concessionaire to the population and, more
importantly, because despite having procedural suggestions, it focuses on
substantive outcomes. Because advocates often predicate a right to openness,
information, and consultation on public ownership of the resource (such as
forests or minerals) or a human right to the resource (such as water or
electricity), it is difficult for governments and concessionaires to implement the
procedural suggestion without recognizing the underlying substantive
ownership or right. If the government and concessionaire did recognize the
underlying public ownership or right, however, this recognition would likely
lead to ex ante restrictions on the terms or conditions of concession
agreements. 139 The concessionaires' fear of these ex ante substantive
restrictions undermines their assent to the potential procedural
137-. Publish What You Pay, Background, www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/
background.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
138. See AMNESTY INT'L, CONTRACTING OUT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: THE CHAD-CAMEROON PIPEINE
PROJECT 41 (2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/ru/library/pdf/
POL3 4 o122005ENGLISH/$File/POL34ol2o5.pdf.
139. See, e.g., Press Release, Global Witness, Global Witness Briefing Document-Cambodia:
Colexim and Everbright Logging Companies (Oct. 22, 2003), available at
http://www.globalwitness.org/media-library-detail.php/37/en/global-wimess-briefing-d
ocumentcambodiacolexim_ (arguing that public ownership of the forest prevents
concessionaires from restricting the use of the forest or community forestry).
117:510 2007
CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
improvement. 14' Thus, though this rights-based procedural reform strategy
has clear moral appeal, its shift in focus and substantive implications
undermine its potential for implementation and thus its ability to effect
positive change. 1
41
In contrast, the solution offered in this Note is truly procedural 4  and
carries no strong implications for ex ante substantive restrictions on
concessions. Furthermore, this conceptual argument presents a lens to focus on
how reforms will enhance the stability of the concession agreements. Because
the argument for procedural reform is based on producing more sustainable
and efficient concession agreements, rather than on producing specific
substantive outcomes, it provides a strong rhetorical pitch to executive officials,
for whom the success of the agreement could carry great political reward, and
to concessionaires, who have a clear financial interest in creating stable
agreements.143 Thus, this strategy provides an easier sell to wary parties.
To maximize effectiveness, however, interested parties must combine this
rhetorical strategy with credible threats to both host country officials and
concessionaires. Credible threats to officials may come in the form of electoral
repercussions for noncompliance (for some elected officials) or economic
incentives for compliance. To a certain extent, threats may occur naturally from
local citizen groups that seek enhanced benefit from concession agreements. A
concerted drive for compliance by the international community may effectively
supplement these threats. One promising model for international involvement,
presented by Publish What You Pay, is an attempt to persuade international
140. Furthermore, where concessionaires recognize human rights only based on external pressure
and not a perceived benefit to themselves, they may simply act to avoid actually effectuating
those rights. See id. ("In early 2003, local people living within the Colexim concession
reported that company representatives were visiting villages and handing out blankets in
exchange for villagers' thumb-printing a document. Colexim subsequently sought to
present this exercise as a consultation with local people about the content and implications
of the company's Strategic Forest Management Plan.").
141. For a discussion of the positive effects stemming from the enactment of the proposed
procedural reforms, see infra Subsection III.B.2.
14a. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
143. For example, academics, officials, and advocates can credibly argue to concessionaires that if
they consult with local parties, the locals will be less likely to oppose the agreement
postenactment because they feel recognized as stakeholders in the agreement. Furthermore,
academics, officials, and advocates can credibly claim that if the concessionaires consult with
local parties, the concession agreement will be more stable because locals know how to adapt
the agreement to the particular conditions in their communities -and can predict the likely
effects of the agreement in their localities more accurately than far-removed national
officials can.
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banks to condition outside project financing in developing countries upon
governments meeting transparency targets. 44
To be most successful in inducing concessionaires and governments to
comply, this line of rhetorical argument must combine pressure from the top
down and from the bottom up. Advocates and other interested parties must
make this case to concessionaires. A credible commitment from governments
or international institutions must supplement this strategy, however. Ideally,
individual governments of the host countries would each condition
negotiations of concession agreements upon transparency principles,
recognizing the benefits that approach would afford to their citizens. However,
even for the most well-meaning governments, that outcome seems unlikely
without outside sources of support or pressure. One solution may be to
advocate a structure analogous to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 14' These
guidelines provide detailed conditions of employment and skills transfers for
multinational enterprises in OECD countries and other signatory countries.4 6
While enterprises' assent to these operating conditions is neither required nor
legally enforceable, 47 the OECD has been remarkably successful at getting
major multinational enterprises to participate and adhere to the guidelines by
relying on the threat of negative publicity for noncompliance and on economic
and business arguments to promote compliance.4 8 Analogously, international
institutions and developing countries' governments could create procedural
guidelines for concessionaires to follow during concession agreement creation
and could promote voluntary compliance of the concessionaires by using
publicity as a weapon and a reward combined with economic arguments.
Thus, conceptualizing concession agreements as traditional matters of
public policy provides a new framework for interested parties to persuade
executive government officials and concessionaires to enhance openness,
deliberation, and local consultation in the creation of the agreement. This
144. See Publish What You Pay, Objectives, http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/
objectives/banks.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
145. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises, June 27, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 237.
146. Id. at 24o.
147. Id. at 239.
148. See PAUL HOHNEN & JASON POTTS, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEv., CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY: AN IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 52 (2007) ("All 30 of the OECD's
industrialized country members have formally adhered to the revised guidelines, as well as




predicates the argument on enhancing the effectiveness and stability of the
agreements while maintaining a procedural, outcome-neutral approach,
avoiding the barriers to acceptance that plague current rights-based strategies.
Therefore, especially when combined with external threats or inducements for
compliance, it presents a credible avenue to push for procedural reform. The
next Subsection examines how these procedural reforms would increase the
potential stability and success of concession agreements by enhancing
transparency, accountability, and responsiveness.
2. Transparency, Responsiveness, Accountability, and Increased Stability and
Success
The reforms - increased open, public deliberation, and increased
consultation with local stakeholders -caused by actors who recast concession
agreements as traditional matters of public policy will substantially enhance
transparency, responsiveness, and accountability in the creation of concession
agreements.
Debate in a public forum would allow affected individuals to follow the
proceedings easily, as compared to closed-door meetings between high-level
government officials, lawyers, and representatives from the concessionaire
company. Public debate would also enhance transparency by giving opposing
political parties,'149 NGOs,' ° and media sources"' increased access to
149. For example, even if the parties to the agreement did not make terms available directly to the
public, opposing parties would strategically release the information they can access to the
public or interest groups that support their position. The United Nations election and
referendum supervision programs, such as those in Malawi and Cambodia, recognized the
opposing party's ability to access and present government information as so important to
transparency and accountability that it served as a key guideline to effective elections. See
Letter Dated 30 October 1991 from the Permanent Representatives of France and Indonesia
to the United Nations Addressed to the United Nations Secretary-General, at 26, U.N. Doc.
A/46/6o8 ("Ensuring fair access to the media, including press, television and radio, for all
parties contesting in the election . ); ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE
ExPRESSION, GUIDELINES FOR BROADCAST COVERAGE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS IN
TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES, guideline 9 (1992), http://aceproject.org/ero-
en/topics/parties-and-candidates/mexoi.pdf.
15o. For example, Transparency International, one of the leading NGOs in the field, seeks to
increase NGOs' access to and dissemination of government information in order to increase
transparency and decrease corruption. Transparency Int'l, Anti-Corruption Handbook,
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/ach (last visited Nov. 4, 2007).
151. See, e.g., Democracy Dialogue on Journalists' Access to Government Information, U.S. INFO, June
4, 2007, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m
=June&x=2007o6o4163025eaifas2.117336e-03 (Eric Johnson, the executive director of
Internews International, describing how he increased journalistic access to governments in
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information about terms and potential effects of concession agreements, which
they would then disseminate to the broader public.
These reforms will also enhance the responsiveness of government officials
to the concerns of the most acutely affected populace. The current method of
concession agreement creation largely neglects local concerns because
government officials exclude local actors from the negotiating table. ' 2
However, nearby populations' increased access to information and consultation
with concessionaires and officials will allow local voices to contribute to the
debate. This consultation may also increase responsiveness to local concerns
because it may encourage the current parties to the agreement to view these
populations more as quasi-parties to the agreement.'"
Finally, such reforms would enhance the accountability of government
officials. Currently, officials who enact the concession agreements face little
accountability because the public is unable to trace concession failure back to
them and because some are unelected.' s4 Government officials currently can
obscure the connection between their negotiations and the outcomes both by
deemphasizing the role that they played in the agreement and by highlighting
the role of the unscrupulous concessionaire if necessary.' ss Decision makers
who do not face popular election are even less accountable for their actions. A
more deliberative and consultative process allows the public to connect the
concession agreements directly to the actions and statements of particular
officials. , 6 This will hold parties accountable by allowing the public more
accurately to dole out political penalties-or rewards-to elected officials
developing countries, thus enhancing transparency of government actions); see also ARTicLE
19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 149, guidelines 8, io, 11 (discussing
the importance of the media in producing transparency about government actions through
voter information and accountability through fair and free elections).
152. See supra Sections I.B, II.B; see also Houskamp & Tynan, supra note 126, at io (noting that of
the twenty-six concession and license agreements studied, only seven "made any specific
reference to or provision for serving low-income households").
153. This does not, however, ensure that government officials will actually implement the policy
preferences of the local population.
154. See, e.g., ARNOLD, supra note 54, at 60-87.
155. See id.
156. Even if the population could merely see the parties and terms of the agreement after its
enactment (without changing the procedure), that would enable them to hold the
responsible officials more accountable. Cf Steve Wood, A Year of Openness in Government?,
BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/46661o.stm (noting that in the
first year after the Freedom of Information Act passed in Britain, giving citizens access to
documents from government bodies, citizens filed an estimated 130,ooo requests for
information and "[n]ew information of real value is reaching the public for the first time,"
such as the level of subsidies the government provides to farmers).
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commensurate with the role that they played in the agreement, as well as to
appropriately credit or punish concessionaire companies, such as by increasing
or withdrawing investments or financing.'
These improvements in transparency, accountability, and responsiveness
will also enhance the success of concession agreements by ameliorating two
major difficulties: local oppositionlss and the propensity for corruption. '1 9 The
changes will decrease local opposition in two major ways. First, to the degree
that voters or other parties can hold leaders accountable for the outcomes of
their decisions, and to the degree that the process responds to local concerns,
agreements that more substantively take into account local opinions and ways
of life are more likely to result. If the content of concession agreements reflects
local concerns, local parties will naturally be less likely to oppose them.6o
Second, even without any substantive changes to the agreements, a more
public procedure will engender less local opposition. The ability to view and
take part in the concession agreement creation in and of itself will allow local
stakeholders to better understand the context of the agreement, be prepared for
the transition, and feel included and accepted. 6 ' A decrease in local opposition
will substantially boost the long-term success prospects of concession
agreements, especially given the strong role that vociferous local opposition has
played in undermining past agreements' stability. 6,
Improvements in transparency, responsiveness, and accountability will also
decrease corruption. Because the absence of transparency and accountability
157. For example, international banks and organizations could more accurately base their
funding of developing country projects (and evaluate their ongoing funding) on whether
the parties actually act in support of their mission. This proposal dovetails with this Note's
suggestions for international involvement. See supra notes 144-147.
158. See supra Section II.B.
159. See supra Subsection II.A.i.
16o. In other words, local populations will usually prove less likely to oppose concession
agreements that actually benefit them, especially in the case of procedural reforms that allow
them to access information to discern the actual effect of the agreement.
161. Significant psychological research as well as firsthand reporting suggests that providing
underrepresented groups with a "seat at the table" can decrease their opposition to the final
agreement. See, e.g., WiLLiAam BOYCE ET AL., A SEAT AT THE TABLE: PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES AND POLICY MAKING 64 (2001) (quoting a member of such a group that its
inclusion was "a very strong symbol that had tremendous repercussions for us. It not only
set a precedent, but it would ensure an equal approach to planning and to public perception,
to political perception."); Donetella della Porta, Protest, Protesters, and Protest Policing: Public
Discourses from Italy and Germany from the 196os to the 198os, in How SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
MATrER 66, 92 (Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam & Charles Tilly eds., 1999) (discussing the
importance of the "politics of signification").
162. See supra Section II.B.
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directly facilitates corruption, any increase in openness and responsibility
produced through democratic deliberation and local consultation will directly
decrease corruption. The responsiveness of the process to local concerns will
also decrease the possibility of corruption. The inclusion of others in the
creation and implementation of concession agreements, especially those with a
great vested interest in the success of the project, will largely prevent a self-
interested executive from crafting a policy for self-gain at the expense of long-
term public benefit.'6
CONCLUSION
Stable concession agreements can provide crucial aid to developing
countries. They present a vital source of income for impoverished
governments.'6 4 They offer key financial resources and technical expertise to
modernize infrastructure by building roads, highways, and airports,' 6' and
they can expand the availability and ensure the efficient provision of most basic
resources such as potable water and electricity.' 66 Yet the concession
agreements implemented thus far have largely failed to live up to this potential
and instead have faced early renegotiation and cancellation. Consequently,
163. This will not serve, of course, as a perfect check, as local players could still collude with
government officials and concessionaires. The more democratic and participatory the
process becomes, however, the less likely such an outcome is to occur.
164. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, CAN AFRICA CLAIM THE 21ST CENTURY? 144 (2000), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/canafricaclaim.pdf ("(P]rivatizing can be a source of
revenue for cash-strapped governments.").
165. See Commission Green Paper on Public Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public
Contracts and Concessions, at 2-3, COM (2004) 327 final (Apr. 30, 2004) ("The public
authorities of Member States often have recourse to PPP arrangements to undertake
infrastructure projects .... At European level, it was recognized that recourse to PPPs could
help to put in place trans-European transport networks, which had fallen very much behind
schedule, mainly owing to a lack of funding."); Mark A. Jamison, Lynne Holt & Sanford V.
Berg, Measuring and Mitigating Regulatory Risk in Private Infrastructure Investment,
ELECTIUcrrY J., July 2005, at 36, 37 ("In developing countries in 1990-20o, nearly 2,500
infrastructure projects involved private participation, with commitments of more than $750
billion.").
166. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 164, at 144 ("Urban power, water, sanitation, and
telecommunications require large investments .... But much of the funding can come from
the private sector... ").
117:510 2007
CONCESSION AGREEMENTS
governments and potential concessionaires are increasingly hesitant to invest in
this critical developmental strategy.1
67
This Note has argued that a substantial reason for the failure of concession
agreements is that developing countries create concession agreements as
traditional bilateral contracts. Executives prevent democratic deliberation at
each stage of concession agreement creation and shield the process from public
view and input. This opaque method induces corruption, shortsighted decision
making, and inefficient tariff setting, and exacerbates local opposition. The
subject matter, purpose, and effects of concession agreements demonstrate that
developing countries and their concessionaires should instead treat concession
agreements as matters of public policy. Such a reconceptualization would
facilitate procedural reforms, which would enhance transparency,
responsiveness, and accountability in the agreement-making procedure, and
consequently reduce corruption and local opposition to the agreements. These
effects would enhance both the stability and the effectiveness of the concession
agreements. Thus, recasting concession agreements as measures of public
policy provides a tool to benefit both concessionaires, who will make increased
profits from stable agreements, and developing countries, which will realize the
intended benefits of the concession, including better roads, highways, and
airports, or increased access to clean water and electricity.
167. See, e.g., Estache, supra note 6, at 25; Ada Karina Izaguirre, Private Infrastructure: A Review of
Projects with Private Participation, 1990-2001, PUB. POL'Y FOR PRIVATE SEcTOR, Oct. 1, 2002,
available at http://ppi.worldbank.org/book/2Solzagu-iolso2.pdf.
